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Recent Decisions
MARYLAND AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No Talisman
Required for
Floating Lien
by John Jeffrey Ross

When a merchant executes a security
agreement with his financier without
specifying that "after acquired property"
shall serve as collateral, a valid security
interest is nonetheless created in that
merchant's inventory, present and future,
when the document shows the intent to
cover "floor plan" or inventory financing.
This is the salient holding of a recent
Court of Appeals decision in answer to
questions certified from the United States
District Court for Maryland. Frankel v.
Associates Financial Services, Inc., 281
Md. 172,377 A.2d 1166 (1977).
The parties, an Article Nine creditor
and a trustee in bankruptcy, were before
the court after a bankruptcy adjudication
in the matter of the Prince George's Truck
Center. The District Court certified the
following questions of law to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§12-601-609 (1974):
1. Did the security interest created
. . . attach to that property
repossessed by [creditorl. which property was acquired by the [bankrupt
Truck Center] after the [security]
Agreement was signed?
2. Where financing statements were
properly filed in the local circuit court
prior to the 1971 amendment to Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Rep!. Vol.) Art
95B, §9-401 changing the requirements regarding place of filing did the
filing of a superfluous subse~uent financing statement in the local circuit
court in . . . 1973, rather than with
the State Department of Assessments
and Taxation [as required by the
amended code] adversely affect any
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prior perfection of the security interest?
281 Md. at 174 , 377 A.2d at 1167.
When a commercial entity passes away
there can be a spectacular series of disputes over the spoils. Often the litigants
are a secured creditor whose rights are
dictated by Article Nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code and a trustee in
bankruptcy existing pursuant to 11
U.s.c. §1 et seq. (The Bankruptcy Act).
Essentially, a bankruptcy trustee is to
bring order to the financial affairs of the
bankrupt debtor's estate. She must consolidate that estate and attempt to distribute the remaining assets to the creditors on an equitable basis. If one creditor
is preferred, the others, of course, suffer
from this favored distribution. Especially
subservient to the consolidation and then
redistribution of the bankrupt's assets is
the creditor without any promise of
security to buttress his loan. On the other
hand, a secured creditor may present a
valid claim to recover the entire amount
of collateral due on the basis of her loan.
The secured creditor goes to the head of
the line, in effect, to recoup all of her outlay in financing the bankrupt's business.
Security thus able to withstand the
vacuum left by bankruptcy, a vacuum
filled by the unprotected creditors, must
be established properly ("perfected") orit
too shall be included in the trust. As
White and Summers have indicated at
page 865 in their text on the Uniform
Commercial Code: "[T]he acid test of the
quality of an Article Nine security interest
is its capacity to survive trustee attack."
On June 10,1970, the Prince George's
Truck Center executed a Wholesale
Security Agreement with Associates Financial Services which covered "all of
[the Truck Center's] collateral" and "proceeds thereof whether or not identifiable,
and the value thereof." This agreement,
of course, represented the bargain of the

parties to grant a security interest in the
designated property. See 48 Temple L.Q.
833.
Subsequent to this, on 12 June, the
parties filed a financing statement with
the clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County. Further statements
were recorded in the court on January 14,
1971 and November 12, 1973.
On February 18, 1975, the Truck
Center transferred 19 trucks to Financial
Services which had financed their
purchase the prior year and for which Financial remained unpaid. Four months
later, on June 17, 1975, the Truck Center
was adjudged bankrupt .
Roger Frankel, appointed trustee in
bankruptcy, attempted to recover these
trucks for the estate in bankruptcy. He
contended that their transfer to the lender
was a voidable preference under §60 of
the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.s.c. §96),
which reads in pertinent part:
§60(a) (1) A preference is a transfer as
defined in this Act, of any of the pr~p
erty of a debtor to or for the benefit of a
creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such
debtor while insolvent and within four
months before the filing by or against

him of the petition intitiating a proceeding under the [Bankruptcy] Act,
the effect of which transfer will enable
such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditors of the same class. (emphasis
supplied).
The preferential transfer of the 19-truck
collateral to the secured lender gave Financial Associates a proportionately
greater slice of the estate than the other
creditors. In arguing that the transfer was
voidable and ineffective to prevent the inclusion of the trucks into the trust in
bankruptcy Frankel stated that "the
Security interest created by the
'Wholesale Security Agreement' . . . did
not attach to that property repossessed by
[Financial Associates], which property
was acquired during 1974, after the
Wholesale Security Agreement was executed." Trustee's brief at 5 (emphasis
supplied). Trustee Frankel urged that the
1970 agreement's extension to the 1975
truck repossessions was frustrated by the
failure of the parties to specify, as supposedly contemplated by Maryland COM
MERCIAL LAW CODE ANN. (1975) §9-204,
that the agreement shall cover after acquired property; He insisted that the
Code required that the intended collateral
must be made clear:
(1) A security interest cannot attach
until there is agreement that it attach
and value is given and the debtor has
rights in the collateral. . .
(3) Except as provided in [another section not relevant here] a sec uri ty agreement may provide that collateral,
whenever acquired, shall secure all
obligations covered by the security
agreement.

plicit articulation of what shall be utilized
as collateral.
Neither the unfavored view of this
"continued general lien" nor the explicitness demanded by the trustee survive the
court's reading of §9-204. The following
passage expresses the law in Maryland, an
effective "YES" answer to the first certified question:
We reject the notion that the security
agreement must specifically contain the
talisman of "after acquired property",
or its equivilant, however phrased, and
prefer instead to interpret the agreement in the light of trade custom and
commercial practice. It seems to us that
. . . a continuing relation was contemplated, in which the lender's lien
extended to the collateral, as it might
exist from time to time, until the
indebtedness was satisfied.
281 Md. at 176, 377 A.2d at 1168. Thus,
although the "inartfully drafted" security
agreement was viewed as inadequate for
§9-204 purposes by the hypertechnical
eye of a trustee in bankruptcy charged
with the vigorous consolidation of all of
the debtor's assets, the court reasonably
perceived a clear intent by the parties to
secure a collateral which remains in a
state of flux, as inventory necessarily
must.
In In re Page, 16 U.c.c. Rep. 501
(M.D. Fla. 1974), the trustee in
bankruptcy argued that the security
agreement which failed to state "after acquired property" placed a clear and
unambiguous limit on the collateral
covered and should not have been altered
by the court to include assets not described in the agreement. In finding a

valid "floating lien" prevalent over the
trustee's claims the court noted that
[t]he fallacy of this argument should be
evident if one considers the nature and
character of the collateral. . . Needless
to say, any reasonable secured party
would be fully aware that this type of
business presupposes a constant change
in the inventory.
To attribute and adopt the narrow construction urged by the trustee would
destroy all inventory financing unless
the security agreement and the financing statement include an after acquired
clause. This approach is contrary to the
general liberal philosophy of the Code
and certainly is contrary to the currently prevailing and accepted commercial practice of financing retail
merchandising businesses.
16 U.C.C. Rep. at 504-505.
It is thus clear that a security interest
resulting from payments for Floor Plan
Advances, increases in, or replacement of
inventory, can only reasonably mean the
intent to attach a floating lien. See HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, at 44 ("inventory . . . includes after acquired collateral"); 48 Temple L.Q. at 835 (creditor
would not be willing to let his security
evaporate as it is sold). See also Whitworth v. Krueger, 98 Idaho 65, - , 558
P.2d 1026, 1031-1032 (term "replacements" enough to create after acquired
interest) .
His first argument rejected, the trustee
in Frankel next contended that the second
certified question should be answered in
the affirmative because the creditor filed
his third Financing Statement at the
wrong place; the security interest lost its

An interest in after acquired property, a
fortiori specifically unidentifiable at the
creation of the security agreement, is the
notorious "floating lien". The trustee's
arguments against this type of security
find sympathy in what section three of the
Official Comments to §9-204 describes as
a prejudicial attitude against allowing a
commercial borrower to "encumber all his
assets, present and future." The commitment of future assets may be thought to
cast an umbra of hardship on the debtor;
such unfairness is mitigated by the ex-
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perfected status, and thus could not prevail over the trustee's inclusion into the

bankrupt's estate. On July 1, 1971
§9-401 was amended to change the
proper place for filing' a financial statement from the circuit courts to the State
Department of Assessments and Taxation.
Instead of filing the third statement with
the Department, the creditor acted as he
had the first two instances and filed this
final statement with the Circuit Court.
The basic issue here was whether the final
statement modified the earlier filings. In
rejection of the trustee's argument, the
court conceded that the third filing was
ineffective, but that under §9-401 (d) such
error had no effect on the properly filed
statements.

Court Shoots
Down
Air Force
by Thomas G. Ross
Lawrence C. Dominic, Esq.
The August 30, 1977 decision in Mead
Data Central, Inc. v. United States
Department of the Air Force, et 0/. (No.
75-2218), _ _ U.S.App.D.C. _ _ ,
_ _ F.2d _ _ , concerned the' applicability and scope of exemption five of
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5
U.s.c. §552(b)(5)(1970 Supp. V 1975).
The appellant appealed from a summary
judgment in favor of the Air Force in
which the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied Mead Data's request for an injunction to compel the Air
Force to disclose the contents of seven
documents relating to a licensing agreement between the Air Force and the West
Publishing Company. The court held that
the requested documents were not subject
to disclosure because the fifth of nine exemptions enumerated within the FOIA
speCifically protected the Air Force
against mandatory release of the documents.
Enacted in 1966, the FOIA was intended to increase public access to
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government records and to encourage
agency responsibility. Congress, through
the Act, changed its policy from one
favoring nondisclosure of governmental
information (under the Administrative
Procedure Act [APA] of 1946) to one of
mandatory disclosure. Whereas the APA
was very restrictive and often abused, requiring access only to "persons properly
and directly concerned" with the matter,
the FOIA mandates disclosure of identifiable governmental records to "any person"
requesting them, subject to the nine
specific exemptions, and provides for
judicial remedy for a government agency's improper withholding of information.
86 HARv. L. REV. 1047-1048 (1973).
The United States Supreme Court in
N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 421
U.S. 132 (1975), held that the "purpose
of the [FOIA] is to establish a general
philosophy of full agency disclosure
unless information is exempted under
clearly delineated statutory language"
and that the Act's intent was to assure the
public's right of access to virtually all
governmental agency documents. The
Court reiterated its position on the FOIA's
function in Dept. of Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352 (1976), holding that "disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act."
Congress did, however, recognize the
need to allow government agencies the
right of nondisclosure for certain documents. The information, to be protected,
must be within one of the following nine
specific exemptions:
1. national defense or foreign policy
interests;
2. agency's internal personnel rules
and practices;
3. specific statutory exemption;
4. trade secrets;
5. inter-agency or intra-agency
memoranda;
6. invasion of personal privacy;
7. investigatory files for law enforcement purposes;
8. regulation of financial institutions;
and
9. information concerning oil wells.
See 5 U.s.c. §§552(b)(1) through (9).
In Mead Data, the Air Force was successful at the trial court level after asserting a claim that the seven documents requested by Mead Data were privileged in

that they fell within exemption five of the
FOIA. That exemption, at 5 U.s.C.
§552(b)(5), states:

[The Act does not apply to] inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be available by
law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency.

The broad and unclear language of exemption five thrusts upon the courts a
major role in the administration of the
Act. 86 HARv. L. REV. at 1066-67 (1973).
The two basic defense claims that can be
made to invoke the privilege under this
exemption are the attorney-client privilege and the privilege protecting those
memoranda involved in the deliberation
and deCision-making governmental process. See generally C. M. Marvick (Ed.),
Litigation Under the Amended Freedom
of Information Act (ACLU 1976).
The seven documents that Mead Data
sought to have disclosed dealt with an Air
Force project involving a computerized
legal research system. Of these, the Air
Force claimed that three were legal opinions in which Air Force attorneys were advising their client as to applicable law
concerning contract negotiations. The Air
Force further asserted that the other four
documents were privileged as internal
memoranda prepared by its employees.
Mead Data argued that the information
requested was purely factual and thus
subject to disclosure, while the Air Force
asserted that it consisted of adViSory opinions and deliberations protected from disclosure by exemption five.
The circuit court agreed with the trial
court's ruling that both the attorney-client
and deliberative process privileges are incorporated into exemption five. However,
it reversed the judgment of the district
court due to its "impermissibly broad interpretation" of these privileges and remanded for a decision based on narrower
constructions outlined in the case. No.
75-2218 slip op. at 34. The court noted
that the congressional intent was that the
exemption be applied "as narrowly as
consistent with efficient government
operation." Id., at 11, n. 16; S. Rep. No.
813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).

